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CLD-047        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2405 
___________ 
 
ANTHONY BODNAR, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN FORT DIX FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civil No. 1-15-cv-02013) 
District Judge:  Honorable Renee M. Bumb 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 13, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 18, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Anthony Bodnar, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
 In 2009, Bodnar was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia of receipt and possession of child pornography.  He was sentenced to 
an aggregate term of 168 months in prison.  Bodnar did not file a direct appeal.  In 2011, 
Bodnar filed a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  The District 
Court denied the motion on the merits.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit denied Bodnar’s request for a certificate of appealability.  
 In 2015, Bodnar filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the 
District of New Jersey.  Bodnar claimed that a Magistrate Judge presided over his plea 
hearing in violation of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).  The District 
Court ruled that Bodnar’s claim is not cognizable under § 2241 and dismissed the petition 
for lack of jurisdiction.  The District Court noted that § 2255’s savings clause, which 
allows a prisoner to pursue a claim under § 2241 where the remedy under § 2255 is 
“inadequate or ineffective,” did not apply.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s legal conclusions and review its factual findings for clear error.  
Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 538-39 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). 
 As recognized by the District Court, “[m]otions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are 
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the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their convictions or 
sentences. . . .”  Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  A habeas 
petition raising such a challenge under § 2241 may not be entertained unless a § 2255 
motion would be “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of the petitioner’s 
detention.  28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538.  We have stated that a § 2255 
motion is inadequate or ineffective “only where the petitioner demonstrates that some 
limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording him a 
full hearing and adjudication of his wrongful detention claim.”  Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538.  
  We have applied this savings clause only in the unusual case where a petitioner 
had no prior opportunity to challenge a conviction for a crime that an intervening change 
in substantive law might have negated.  In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 
1997).  This is not the case here.  Bodnar does not claim that he is factually or legally 
innocent based on new authority.  Rather, he relies on a recent appellate decision to 
support his claim of a statutory violation regarding the procedure used in his case.  As 
Bodnar recognizes, he is unable to satisfy the requirements for filing a second or 
successive § 2255 motion.  However, he may not invoke § 2241 merely because he is 
unable to file such a motion.  Id.  
 Accordingly, because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
